Abstract
This paper presents a novel experimental investigation into how status quo bias shapes voter behavior and welfare outcomes in a common-value election setting. Participants first complete a real-effort task under one of two payment plans, in which their experience provides a noisy signal of which plan is welfare-enhancing. They then vote between the two plans in a common-value election that determines payoffs in a subsequent repetition of the task. We find clear and robust evidence of status quo bias, even in this context that rules out transition and uncertainty costs and endowment and default effects as psychological drivers. Because prior empirical work suggests that status quo voting may be associated with negative emotions, we also employ emotion-induction treatments to test whether affective states modulate the strength of the bias. The results show no interaction between emotional state and the magnitude of the status quo effect. These findings illustrate that status quo bias is a powerful force that can either stabilize efficient policies or entrench harmful ones, depending on the underlying policy environment.