Abstract
The objective of this study is to conduct a functional analysis of review clauses in Japanese law using nudge theory. The study will empirically verify whether laws are revised after the implementation of review clauses. These clauses have become established practice incorporated into laws at a certain rate. To this end, based on the nudge framework in behavioral economics, review clauses were conceptualized as choice architecture, and empirical analysis was conducted. The empirical analysis examined 453 bills enacted between 2015 and 2019, excluding preparatory legislation. The hypotheses were subjected to rigorous testing using advanced multivariate analysis techniques, such as multiple regression analysis in conjunction with quantitative text analysis. The findings indicated that the majority of laws incorporating review clauses are subject to revision through legislative amendments. Furthermore, it was observed that the review deadline has a significant impact on the duration of the review period. The discussion section noted that review clauses function as choice architecture, exhibiting effects similar to default effects and commitment effects observed in nudge. The significance of this study lies in clarifying the function of review clauses from a law and economics perspective, while also identifying numerous points of intersection with legal sociology, such as legislative process theory, typology of law, and legal consciousness theory.